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CAN PATRIOTISM JUSTIFY KILLING
IN DEFENSE OF ONE’S COUNTRY?1
Abstract: Cosmopolitan liberals would be ready to fight – and to kill and be
killed – for the sake of restoring international justice or for the abolition of pro-
foundly unjust political institutions. Patriots are ready to do the same for their own
country. Sometimes the cosmopolitan liberals and patriots would fight on the same
side and sometimes on the opposite sides of the conflict. Thus the former would join
the latter in the defense of Serbia against Austria-Hungary (in 1914) but would op-
pose the white Southerner patriots in the American Civil War (in 1861). In this paper
I argue that fighting and killing for one’s country is, in both of those cases, different
from the defense of one’s own life and the lives of those who cannot defend them-
selves. Killing for one’s country is killing in order to fulfill a particular political pref-
erence. The same is the case with fighting for the abolition of a profoundly unjust po-
litical institution. It is not amoral or immoral to refuse to kill for any one of these two
political preferences because there is no reason to believe that either political prefer-
ence trumps our moral constraints against killing.
Keywords: patriotism, defense, killing, humanism, cosmpolitanism, moral
justification.
The question I would like to explore in this paper is:
• Does patriotism offer distinctive moral reasons for killing
people in pursuit of patriotic goals?
‘Distinctive moral reasons’ are here the moral reasons spe-
cific to patriotism as an attitude or worldview which are distinct
from other types of attitude or worldview. Patriotism, as I understand
it, favours one country and its inhabitants over all other countries.
This is a consequence of the nature of love: love is, by definition, di-
rected to one item or items which favoured over all other items or ob-
jects. If patriotism is a love for one’s country, then it presupposes
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1 This paper, under the title ‘Killing for one’s country’, was presented at the
workshop on patriotism held at the Centre for Public Philosophy and Applied Ethics
of the University of Melbourne in August 2006.
favouring that country over all others. Favouring one’s country is a
notoriously – and perhaps intentionally – vague notion. But for the
purposes of this paper, we shall assume that if I favour my country
over others in a patriotic manner, I am ready to fight and kill others
for the sake of my country and not other countries or other causes. I
shall discuss below a variety of interpretations of the phrases ‘for the
sake of my country’or ‘for one’s own country’. Apatriotic attitude or
worldview implies that this readiness to fight and kill is morally
praiseworthy and, indeed, the moral duty of a patriot. Patriotism may
even be defined in terms of such duties: for a person to be a patriot, it
is necessary that she or he is ready to fight – and thus to die and to kill
– for the sake of one’s own country. This prima facie duty is not nec-
essarily related to any other just cause; for a patriot, fighting for
one’s own country is, at least prima facie, a just cause.
In contrast to patriotism, cosmopolitan liberalism (sometimes
based on Kantian universalism) offers no moral reasons for fighting
for one’s own country as opposed to any other country. Acosmopoli-
tan liberal is ready to fight – as a last resort – in the defense of a just
cause. A just cause is, among other things, a defense of a just state
from unprovoked and unwarranted attack. A cosmopolitan liberal
would be ready to fight – as a last resort – in the defense of any just
country from such an attack that needs his or her services for this
purpose. The qualifications regarding the last resort and the need for
the services of cosmopolitan liberals suggest for a cosmopolitan lib-
eral there is no prima facie duty of fighting for any country. For a
person to be a cosmopolitan liberal, it is not necessary that he or she
be ready to fight in the defense of any country.
Clearly a patriot and a cosmopolitan liberal may find them-
selves fighting together against the same enemy. But according to
the above account, the reasons justifying their fight should be dif-
ferent – a patriot would be fighting for her or his country and a cos-
mopolitan liberal to defend that just country from an unprovoked
and unwarranted attack. In this paper I shall attempt to find out how
the patriot’s reasons differ from those of a cosmopolitan liberal and
whether either of these reasons provide a moral justification for
killing.
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‘Fighting for one’s own country’
‘Fighting’here obviously means voluntarily participating in a
violent conflict as an armed combatant. Participation in such a con-
flict presupposes readiness to be killed and to kill others. Voluntary
participation does not, however, imply a belief that killing and being
killed provide the best way of resolving the political differences or
differences in the political demands leading to conflict nor does it
imply the belief that one’s country’s cause is right. Voluntary partici-
pation only implies that the combatant was not forced or was not in-
timidated by the use of coercion (for example, imprisonment) to par-
ticipate and that the primary motivation for participation was not
social pressure such as the fear of social exclusion or ostracism of
the non-participants.
But ‘for one’s own country’ is, in contrast, very vague be-
cause, historically, it has come to include a variety of different
causes. The phrase has come to include:
1. Fighting against the forces of another state or states which
are crossing the border of the territory of the state of which one is a
citizen.
2. Fighting against the forces of an insurrectionary or seces-
sionist movement within that state.
3. Fighting as part of a resistance movement against the occu-
pying forces of another state or against the internal occupying forces
armed and supported by an outside state.
4. Fighting, as part of occupying forces in an overseas colony,
against the anti-colonial resistance forces or against the forces of an-
other state invading that colony.
5. Fighting as part of an invading force which aims to gain
control over the territory of a state in order to remove from it the oc-
cupying forces of another state.
6. Fighting as part of an invading force allegedly aiming to
prevent the state (which is being invaded) from attacking other
states, including one’s own state.2
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2 There is perhaps the seventh category of fighting as a part of an invading
force aiming to remove the oppressive or unjust regime in the state which is being in-
vaded. It is not clear whether in such a case one is fighting for one’s country or for the
ideals of liberal (or other kinds) of justice. That is, it is unclear whether one is acting
for cosmopolitan or patriotic reasons (or for both).
Patriotism: liberal and non-liberal
In this paper I examine only the cases of the first two types –
fighting against the forces of another state crossing the border of my
country and against the forces of a movement which aims to secede a
part of the state and to create another state. In both types of case, a
fighting patriot appears to be defending her or his country from the
forces which want to take away the whole or part of his country from
him and his fellow patriots. If successful, these armed forces he or
she is fighting will impose a government composed of people whom
our patriot does not consider to be patriots – who do not love the
country, at least not in the way he or she loves it. In such a case, the
country is no longer his or hers because it is ruled by non-patriots im-
posed by foreign forces. In most cases, violent secessionist move-
ments are supported by outside states; in such a case, an outside state
appears to be taking a part of the beloved country from its patriots.
Even in those cases of secession when the outside states are mini-
mally involved, secessionists are, for a patriot, anti-patriots or trai-
tors to his or her country.
As it has been frequently pointed out both by philosophers
and non-philosophers, a patriotic view such as the one above is often
contested by people who consider themselves patriots too. A patriot
can welcome an armed invasion of his country by another state for at
least two reasons: first, the foreign forces may remove an oppressive
and, therefore, non-patriotic regime and allow true patriots to come
to rule; second, the foreign forces may help the (secessionist) patri-
ots to reclaim, from its present alien government, the territory for its
local population and enable them to establish a state of their own. In
a case of the second kind, the present central government, ruling
over the country (which is not an independent state) which those pa-
triots love, is for them an alien and oppressive and not a patriotic
government.
One needs to note that this is a contest of political and not of
anthropological or moral views. There are two distinct political is-
sues at stake: whether the regime is oppressive and whom, if anyone,
does the regime oppress. For a cosmopolitan liberal these issues
would be crucial in deciding whether she or he should fight for the
regime in question. A cosmopolitan liberal would refuse to fight for
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an oppressive regime or would fight for it only if its enemy, threaten-
ing to overthrow it, is even more oppressive.
But as Nathamson3 has emphasized, a liberal patriot can also
refuse to fight for an oppressive regime in his country. For a liberal
patriot, the slogan ‘My country right or wrong’simply does not hold.
For a liberal patriot, the country for which he or she is ready to fight,
is a liberal and just country and therefore, he or she is ready to fight
against anyone who has, by force, imposed an illiberal or oppressive
regime in his country. In doing so, he or she is fighting for his or her
country too.
Of course, not all patriots are liberal patriots, nor are all liber-
als cosmopolitan liberals. Many non-liberal patriots would fight for
their country although their country is not liberal and has, by liberal
standards, an oppressive regime. But if one is a patriot, one does not
have to start as a non-liberal patriot and then chooses to become a
liberal one. Liberalism need not be an addition to patriotism; it can
be (and is) an integral part of a patriotic conception of one’s own
country.
Let us now consider a case in which cosmopolitan liberals
and patriots (both liberal and non-liberal) would fight together
against a common enemy.
Fighting and killing together: patriots and cosmopolitans
Take thecase of a relatively non-oppressive liberal state ex-
posed to a military invasion by a comparably non-oppressive liberal
state. This, I would say, was the situation in August 1914: Aus-
tria-Hungary, a parliamentary monarchy under an Austrian Habs-
burg dynasty, attacked another, much smaller parliamentary monar-
chy, Serbia. The ostensible reason for the attack was the refusal of
Serbia to allow Austro-Hungarian police officials to ‘carry out judi-
cial inquiries’ that is, search for the instigators of the assassination of
the heir to the Austrian Imperial throne, Franz Ferdinand. Unknown
to the Serbian civilian government at the time, one of those was the
chief of Serbian military intelligence whom the Serbian civilian au-
thorities were not likely to arrest and bring to trial.
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3 In his Patriotism, morality and peace, Lanham, USA,1993.
For a cosmopolitan liberal this would not be a sufficiently
good reason to use the last resort – armed invasion – to bring the cul-
prits of this murder to justice, in particular since armed invasion was
not likely to bring these particular culprits to justice. Serbia was,
therefore, exposed to an unwarranted and unjust attack. This interna-
tional injustice would justify a cosmopolitan liberal joining the fight
on Serbia’s behalf. In contrast, liberal and non-liberal Serbian patri-
ots would be (and were) fighting for their country against a foreign
enemy who was intent on imposing a foreign government on their
country.
Perhaps one should also mention that the Habsburg patriots of
various nationalities, while also fighting for their country (and its
emperor and king), were fighting for a different cause: they were
fighting to punish a state, Serbia, which attacked their state and its
officials by terrorist means and was, in this and other ways, ende-
avouring to detach a part of its territory (the recently annexed former
Ottoman territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina). By punishing – and
occupying – Serbia they were aiming to prevent its further forays
into their country’s territory. Their cause apparently belongs to the
sixth category of ‘fighting for one’s country’ above.
Patriotism and self-defense
To return to those ready to fight and kill for Serbia. In fighting
for Serbia and against Austro-Hungarian invasion, cosmopolitan
liberals were fighting to restore and strengthen justice in interna-
tional relations. Serbian patriots were fighting to retain the control of
their country from a violent foreign enemy. Are these morally valid
reasons for killing people, in this case persons of various nationali-
ties (including Serb) wearing Austro-Hungarian uniforms?
There is little doubt then the Serbian or Entente soldiers kill-
ing soldiers in Austro-Hungarian uniforms who were attacking Ser-
bian territory in 1914 were doing so in self-defense and in the de-
fense of the lives of the defenseless. But killing in self-defense or
defense of the defenseless is significantly different from killing for
any of the above reasons. First, the sole aim of killing in such situa-
tions is to stop or prevent killing or the loss of lives, in this case the
life of the person who is defending himself or herself or of those
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whom he/she is defending. Second, killing in such defense situations
does not presuppose or imply that human lives (of anyone) are
ranked on a scale including political or other goals. In a defense situ-
ation, one is taking a human life not in order to further some other
goal but to save another human life or lives. In such situations, hu-
man lives are not regarded as instruments towards any other goal but
that of saving human lives.
But if this justifies killing in the above situation, it justifies it
regardless of any additional motivation – patriotic or cosmopolitan –
that the killers might have had in joining in the fighting against Aus-
tria-Hungary. The self-defense justification does not make any addi-
tional motivation a moral justification for killing.
At this point one may want to distinguish patriotic from cos-
mopolitan motivation for fighting and killing in the following way.
Fighting for one’s country – at least in a situation such as the one
above – is, one would argue, indistinguishable from self-defense and
defense of the defenseless while fighting for international justice is
not. When one is fighting against the attackers of one’s country, one
is fighting for one’s country by defending oneself and those who
cannot defend themselves, but when one is fighting to restore inter-
national justice one is not, eo ipso, fighting in self-defense or de-
fense of defenseless. Yet as long as one is a soldier under attack or
about to be attacked4, she or he – at least on the above view of
self-defense – is justified in killing the attackers, regardless of his or
her motivation for donning this uniform and joining the fighting. In
this kind of situation cosmopolitan liberals are justified as much as
patriots are in killing their attackers.
Losing one’s life and losing one’s country: patriotic altruism
And yet a patriot has, personally, much more to lose from de-
feat and occupation of his or her country than a cosmopolitan liberal:
if the enemy takes over his or her country, a patriot is forced to en-
dure the foreign or non-patriotic rule and its arbitrariness (at least in
his or her eyes) and to be exposed to daily humiliations and punish-
ments for his patriotic stance and resistance. A forced exile from his
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4 Or is a person defending those who cannot defend themselves.
home, family and social group may be equally or even more painful.
A cosmopolitan liberal, while suffering from the injustice caused by
the defeat, can move to another liberal country to fight another day,
without feeling the pain of separation or humiliation. The cosmopol-
itan’s suffering and loss appears less painful and burdensome than
that of the patriot.
But does an attempt to prevent that loss of one’s country and
the associated humiliation provide an additional justification for
killing those who are intent on causing the loss, a justification which
is different from that of self-defense? Of course, many patriots be-
lieve that their attempt to prevent the loss of their country by killing
its attackers is, by itself, self-defense: in staving off the loss, they be-
lieve they are defending themselves and their compatriots.
Losing one’s life is obviously different from losing one’s
country to foreign rule. And, in spite of fervent patriotic equalization
of the two, one could claim that a human life is of a different moral
worth than freedom from foreign domination. In fact, against the pa-
triotic equalization of the two, one could argue that a loss of one’s
country, however painful, is not a harm on the same level or kind or
of that magnitude as the loss of one’s life. If so, a patriot appears to
be ready to inflict a greater harm on someone else (by killing him or
her) in order to prevent a lesser harm (the loss of one’s country) to
himself or herself.
Many patriots are, however, ready to lose their lives in order
to prevent the loss of their country. This shows that they value their
own country more than their own lives. Their readiness to lose their
lives for the sake of their country indicates that they reject the above
ranking according to which losing one’s country ranked as a lesser
harm than the loss of one’s life and is viewed as a harm of different
kind. Patriotism in such a case appears to be a radical form of politi-
cal altruism: here a patriot values a particular political situation more
than one’s life. And as a form of altruism, radically altruistic patrio-
tism also appears to be morally praiseworthy.
If morally praiseworthy, can altruism justify otherwise im-
moral or morally impermissible acts? Consider the following two
questions: If I am ready to give all my belongings to the poor – and in
fact do so – can my altruism justify my taking, by force or deception,
other people’s belongings and distributing those to the deserving
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poor? If I am ready to die in the defense of international justice, can
my altruism justify my killing of those who breach international jus-
tice? If we believe that patriotic altruism justifies killing for a
patriotix cause, then, I think, we would need to admit that cosmopol-
itan altruism also justifies killing for cosmopolitan causes. If so, pa-
triotism would not differ, as a putative moral justification for killing,
from cosmopolitan liberalism.
Let us now consider another type of case in which patriots and
cosmopolitan liberals part company and appear to be ready to fight
and kill each other.
Fighting against one another: cosmopolitan
liberals against patriots
Like the Serbian soldiers in World War I, the white soldiers of
the Southern Confederacy in the American Civil War were fighting
against armed forces intent on imposing a foreign government and
foreign legal, political and social relations in their country. Among
these patriots were some liberal patriots who believed that slavery is
an unjust institution which needs to be abolished and wanted it abol-
ished in the Southern states. Some of them believed that the use of
foreign armed force to abolish illiberal political institutions is in-
compatible with the principles which allow the use of armed force
only in self-defense and the defense of the defenseless. Others be-
lieved on the scale of unjust actions armed invasion of their country
is significantly more unjust (in part, perhaps, because it causes the
loss of life) than maintenance of the unjust institution of slavery
(which, in principle, can be abolished without the loss of life). In
short, armed resistance to the armed forces of the North invading the
South was not incompatible with those liberal political principles
which reject slavery as unjust.
And yet cosmopolitan liberals, if they sided with any one side
in this conflict, would have sided with the North and against the
South. The North was fighting for a just cause – the abolition of pro-
foundly unjust institutions – and many cosmopolitan liberals be-
lieved (and still believe) that armed force should be used, as last re-
sort, to remove such profoundly unjust institutions.
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Does cosmopolitan liberalism morally trump patriotism, even
liberal patriotism, in a case such as this? In other words:
• Is it morally justifiable to kill, in a war, someone who is re-
sisting the removal of a profoundly unjust political institution?
By profoundly unjust I mean institutions which systemati-
cally treat human beings as unequal and thus restrict the liberties of
the less equal and humiliate them as inferior beings. In the present
context, ‘profoundly unjust’ does not include ‘an institutional set-up
which systematically kills innocent people’. The latter is, of course,
profoundly unjust but is more than that. To remove an institutional
set-up aiming at killing and killing innocents – such as those of Nazi
Germany or Communist Cambodia – is to defend the lives of those
who are not in position to defend themselves. In other words, remov-
ing such an institution is to act in the defense of lives of those who
cannot defend themselves. The institution of slavery in the Southern
States, however cruel and profoundly unjust, was not an institution
set up systematically to kill innocent people.
The above question could be now compared to the one raised
above:
• Is it morally justifiable for a native to kill, in a war, a for-
eigner who is attempting to remove native rulers and institutions and
impose, by force, a set of foreign institutions and foreign-supported
rulers?
In the first case, the killing is done in the defense of the vic-
tims of politically unjust institution and, in the second, in the defense
of native victims of foreign institutions and rulers. In neither of the
two situations is the killing performed in the defense of human lives.
As we have seen, many cosmopolitan liberals would answer
positively to the first question. This shows that they rank the removal
of profoundly unjust institutions higher than the lives of at least
some people, possibly including their own. Likewise, patriots who
would answer positively to the second question, rank the freedom
from foreign rule higher than the lives of some people, often includ-
ing themselves. In other words, if the freedom from foreign rule can
be achieved only through the loss of their lives, they would prefer
that option than the option of living under foreign rule.
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Both cosmopolitan liberals and patriots believe that their
ranking is that of moral value or worth. Their readiness to sacrifice
their lives for the realization of their political preferences, as we
have noted above, may be regarded as a morally praiseworthy al-
though somewhat radical altruism. The moral praise bestowed on
their altruism might have led them to believe that the ranking of their
preferences which underlies their altruism is a ranking of the prefer-
ence’s moral worth.
There are, however, some reasons to doubt that rankings of
preferences of this kind are rankings of moral worth or value. First, if
the outcome or result of a particular ranking is subject to moral
praise, it does not follow that the ranking itself is a ranking of moral
values or ‘valuables’. In this case, what has been praised, morally, is
the altruism of patriots, that is, their readiness to sacrifice their lives,
and not their higher ranking of their preference to die for the freedom
of their country than to endure foreign rule. Second, one can recog-
nize the patriotic stance as altruistic but refuse morally to praise it.
Not all altruistic attitudes are morally praiseworthy. For example, if
one agrees to be killed or kills oneself so that one’s organs could be
given, as transplants, to those who need them, this may be consid-
ered an irrational and not morally praiseworthy act. Likewise, a paci-
fist or cosmopolitan liberal may refuse to bestow moral praise on pa-
triotic altruism and argue that their altruism is of no moral value.
Third, not all rankings of human lives, including one’s own life, are
ranking of moral worth or value. If one values one’s own life higher
than the lives of Africans or Asians, one’s ranking, while having
moral significance, is not a ranking of moral worth or value.
In seeking justification for killing, both patriots and cosmo-
politan liberals compare political arrangements with human lives
and rank these on a single scale. They clearly prefer or value certain
political arrangements more than they do certain human lives. But,
as I suggested above, there is no reason to believe that theirs is a
ranking of moral values as opposed to political preferences.
Patriotism: political not moral
From this one can infer that the patriots’ justification for kill-
ing for his or her country is based on their political preferences and
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not on a moral code. Similarly, one can infer that the cosmopolitan
liberals’ justification for killing for the sake of removal of profound
injustices is based on their political preferences which obviously dif-
fer from those of the patriots.
One can endorse both sets of preferences and follow one or
the other set, depending on the circumstances. Thus one can kill for
one’s country, when one’s country is in danger and also kill when in-
ternational justice in some of its profound forms is in danger. Some-
times both are in danger at the same time and in the same place and
then one’s killing appears to be doubly justified. But one can also de-
cline to kill for any one of two causes and yet admire altruism and
self-sacrifice of patriots and cosmopolitan liberals who are ready die
for their causes. And, of course, one can decline both to kill and to
admire any dying (and killing) for these or any other political goals.
In this essay I attempted to argue that the last response to pa-
triotism and to cosmopolitan liberalism is neither amoral nor im-
moral. This is so because there is no reason to believe that either pa-
triotism or cosmopolitan liberalism can override the moral principle
which regards human life paramount and which allows killing only
in self-defense or the defense of the defenseless. One can argue, in
different ways, that no political preference can override such a moral
principle. One such argument would be perhaps this.Killing inflicts
irreparable harm on others. No political or any other action can re-
pair this kind of harm. The above moral principle constrains us from
inflicting irreparable harm of this kind on others, in part because it is
irreparable. If so, why should political preferences which justify and
encourage our inflicting of such harm on others, override the above
moral constraints? Why should the politics of patriots or cosmopoli-
tan liberals trump morality? In order to attempt answer these ques-
tions one would no doubt need at least another paper.
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Aleksandar Pavkoviæ
MOE LI PATRIOTIZAM DA OPRAVDA UBIJANJE
U ODBRANI SVOJE ZEMLJE?
Saetak
Kosmopolitski liberali bi bili spremni da se bore – kao i da ubijaju i budu
ubijeni – zarad uspostavljanja meðunarodne pravde ili za ukidanje duboko nepraved-
nih politièkih ustanova. Patrioti su spremni da uèine isto za svoju zemlju. Ponekad se
kosmopolitski liberali i patrioti bore na istoj strani, a ponekad na suprotnim stranama
u sukobu. Tako bi se, na primer, liberali pridruili patriotima u odbrani Srbije od Aus-
trougarske (1914. godine), ali bi se suprotstavili belim junjaèkim patriotima u Ame-
rièkom graðanskom ratu (1861). U ovom radu obrazlaem tezu da je borba i ubijanje
za svoju zemlju u oba sluèaja nešto razlièito od odbrane sopstvenog ivota i ivota
onih koji ne mogu da se sami brane. Ubijanje za svoju zemlju jeste ubijanje kako bi se
ostvarila odreðena politièka preferencija. Isto vai za ratovanje zarad ukidanja dubo-
ko nepravedne politièke ustanove. Nije amoralno ili imoralno odbiti da ubijamo zbog
bilo koje od ovih politièkih preferencija, zato što nema razloga da verujemo kako bilo
koja od njih nadjaèava moralne uzde koje nas spreèavaju da ubijamo.
Kljuène reèi: patriotizam, odbrana, ubijanje, humanizam, kosmpolitanizam,
moralno opravdanje.
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